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Abstract 
 
 
The period of British colonialism and the expansion of British influence in India occurred over a 
number of years. This research paper focuses primarily on the period from 1798 to 1805, with 
particular reference to the period of conflict in 1803. While many aspects of this period are well 
known, a number of less well recognised influences have had considerable impact on the capacity 
for British expansionism. 
 
This research paper examines the influence of the second Anglo-Mahratta wars, and in particular 
of the simultaneous campaigns of General Lake and Arthur Wellesley, primarily against Dawlut 
Rao Scindia and Bhonsla, Rajah of Berar.  These campaigns have particular political and military 
significance, and mark a change in Anglo-Indian relations.  The military strategies, intentions and 
outcomes of these are discussed, and recognition given to the innovations in regard to logistics 
and warfare.  These elements were central to the expansion of British influence as they resulted 
in both the acceptance of the British as a great martial power, and helped to create a myth of the 
invincibility of British arms. From a political perspective these campaigns in particular also 
legitimised British power in India, as they defeated their rival powers, discredited the French, and 
brought the Moghul Emperor and his chief minister the Peshwa under British protection. The 
primary source material available for this research consisted of military despatches and 
documents of colonial government. These sources granted insight into the role of the British 
political and military bodies within India at a command level. 
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Glossary of terms 
 
Bazaar  Market, often established within a military camp 
Berar  A country of the Eastern Mahrattas, with a capital of Elichpoor  
Bhonsla/Bhoonslah  The family name of the Rajah’s of Berar, the full name and titles of 
the Rajah of Berar in 1803 were Semah Sahib Soubah Ragojee 
Bhoonslah 
 
Coolies  Men and women of low caste who carry baggage with armies, 
porters and labourers 
 
Deccan  South. Applied to the country South of the Nerbudda, and between 
that and the Kistna Rivers   
 
Escalade  The scaling of fortified walls using ladders, as a form of military 
attack 
 
Havildar  A non commissioned officer of native troops, equivalent rank of 
Sergeant 
 
Hindustan  The country between the Indus, the Ganges and the Nerbudda with 
a boundary of the mountains of Thibet and Tartary 
 
Holkar  The family name of one of the great Mahratta chiefs, whose 
territory was Malwa and whose capital was the city of Indore. The 
chief of which in 1803 was Jeswunt Rao Holkar 
 
Hyderbad  The capital and seat of the Nizam 
Indore The Capital of Holkar in Malwa 
Jah  The title of the Nizam and of Scindia 
Jemindar  Junior rank of officer in the Native troops 
Malwa  A country North of the Nerbudda, divided between Scindia and 
Holkar 
 
Mahratta Empire  Founded in the seventeenth century, and nominally ruled by the 
Rajah of Sattarah, but in reality ruled through the body of the 
Peshwah, the chief magistrate of the Empire. The principle chiefs of 
which being in 1803, The Rajah of Sattarah, The Peshwa, The Rajah 
of Berar, Dowlut Rao Scindia, Jeswunt Rao Holkar and Anund Rao 
Guickwar 
5 
 
Mogul  The title of the Mahomedan emperors of Hindustan 
Mysore  A country South of the Deccan, previously conquered from the 
Hindu Rajahs by Hyder Ali, conquered by the British and ostensibly 
restored to the ancient ruling family after the fall of Seringapatam 
 
Nizam  The Soubahdar of the Deccan, reigning over a large portion of 
territory between the Wurda, Godavery, and Kistna Rivers. With a 
Capital at Hyderbad, the Nizam possessed in 1803 these names and 
titles, Nizam and Dowlut, Asoph Jah, Soubahdar of the Deccan, and 
was succeeded in 1803 by his son, Secundar Jah 
   
Killidar  An Indian term for the governor of a fort 
Mahratta/Maratha  A member of the princely and military castes of the former Hindu 
kingdom of Maharashtra in central India 
 
Peshwa/Peshwah/Peishwah Literally ‘the first’, the chief magistrate of the Mahratta Empire, 
whose capital and seat of government is at Poona  
 
Pettah  A suburb or outwork of a fortified place with walls and a ditch 
Poona  The capital and seat of government of the Peshwa 
Poonah  The capital and seat of government of the Peshwa 
Rajah  The Hindu title of a prince 
Scindia/Scindiah/Sindia  The family name of the great Mahratta chief, jaghiridar of the 
empire, but afterwards independent. His territory was in Malwa, 
and his capital Ougein. His names and titles in 1803 were The 
Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindia. Scindia had significantly 
increased his territories through conquest in Hindustan 
 
Sepoy  Native troops 
 
 
 
Definitions taken from the list of definitions of Indian terms provided in Colonel Gurdwood’s account1 
                                                          
1 The Dispatches of Field Marhsall the Duke of Wellington during his various campaigns in India, Denmark, 
Portugal, Spain, The Low Countries, and France, from 1799 – 1818, Compiled from official and Authentic 
documents, by Lieut. Colonel Gurwood, First volume, London, John Murray, Albemarle Street 1837 
https://archive.org/stream/dispatchesindex01welluoft#page/n7/mode/2up   
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Introduction 
 
The second Mahratta war can be better described not as a single war, but as a series of actions 
between the East India Company (EIC) and Dawlut Rao Scindia, occasionally with the assistance 
of Bhonsla, Rajah of Berar, as well a separate campaign against Jeswant Rao Holkar. To call these 
varying stages a single war seems to only serve the purpose of making the Mahratta ‘threat’ 
appear more cohesive than indeed it was. The campaign against Scindia and Bhonsla was the 
most significant in terms of the forces committed by both the East India Company and Mahratta 
chiefs. This campaign resulted in the greatest loss of life and had the most significant lasting 
results. These simultaneous campaigns are the primary focus of this paper. Although the 
Mahrattas were at no point united, the concern that they may unite and repel British expansion 
was real. The political realities of the EIC and its relations with surrounding Indian states are 
central to an understanding of the Mahratta campaigns. The military aspects of these campaigns 
are of equal import and reveal how it was that a small number of British, with the assistance of a 
large number of sepoys, managed to defeat a larger number of native, often European trained, 
troops and armies in difficult terrain. These difficulties of terrain and supply, although significant, 
share an equal weight with the difficulties of actually engaging the enemy and bringing forces to 
battle. By understanding the complexities of military strategy and the intricacies of individual 
battles, their relevance to the construction of British influence becomes apparent. These, 
together with other military interventions including sieges reveal key aspects of the British 
approach in India, highlighting the impact not only of military supremacy, but the political 
benefits of demonstrable power. The actual campaigning itself together with the various battles 
fought illustrates the approach that culminated in the successful expansion of British India. 
 
Historiography 
Most historiography relating to these campaigns has been either an almost hagiographical 
account of the life of public figures within British India, or broader accounts on either the military 
or political aspects of the campaign. However, of these accounts, many draw heavily from 
secondary sources, without using the available despatches. Within this paper secondary sources 
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are often compared with the despatches available, in order to further critique them. The military 
history of the campaign itself is placed alongside its political impact, in order to explore the 
relevance of military actions such as battles and sieges to the developing position and prestige of 
the British within India.  
 
 Interest in the topic has been sporadic, beginning from around forty years after the campaign 
itself was fought, often written by ex-civil-servants from the East India Company (EIC), and former 
officers. The accounts of Edward Thornton are an example of this. A diplomat, who wrote a 
comprehensive History of British India in 1842, provides insight into political intrigue which is 
often not included in the later sources.2 Later historians can be seen to focus primarily on key 
figures and their individual influence. The majority of these focused on the characters of Arthur 
or Richard Wellesley. Arthur Wellesley was a particularly popular figure for a number of almost 
hagiographical texts, such as Arthur Bryant’s, The Great Duke or The Invincible General3 and 
Richard Holmes Wellington, The Iron Duke.4 Bryant, in particular glorifies Arthur Wellesley and 
his British troops with quite colourful language, while neglecting to mention even the presence 
of sepoy troops at the battle of Assaye, apart from a brief reference to native cavalry.5 Indeed, 
many accounts make light of the sepoy contribution, although more coherent attempts to 
understand the position and role of the native troops, have emerged in recent years, including 
the works of Douglas Peers who discusses the construction of the Bengal army6. A great number 
of secondary sources appear to draw where possible from the accounts of Lieut. Colonel 
Gurwood. Gurwood, having served with Arthur Wellesley, compiled a selection of Wellesley’s 
very detailed despatches, the first and second volumes of which are from his time in India.7 
Information on other key figures from the campaign is less readily available. The campaigns of 
                                                          
2 Edward Thornton, History of British Empire in India III, (London, Wm. H. Allen and Co., 1842) 
3 Arthur Bryant, The Great Duke or The Invincible General (London, Collins, 1971) 
4 Richard Holmes, Wellington, The Iron Duke, (London, Harper Collins, 2003) 
5 Bryant, The Great Duke or The Invincible General, pp. 53 – 56. 
6 Douglas M. Peers, The Habitual Nobility of Being: British Officers and the Social Construction of the Bengal Army 
in the Early Nineteenth Century, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 25, No.3 1991, pp. 545-569 
7 The Dispatches of Field Marhsall the Duke of Wellington during his various campaigns in India, Denmark, 
Portugal, Spain, The Low Countries, and France, from 1799 – 1818, Compiled by Lieut. Colonel Gurwood, vol 1, 
(London, John Murray, Albemarle Street 1837) 
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Lieut. General Lake lack the detailed compilation of despatches, and so the secondary sources 
have less to draw from, and are less prolific. Some of Lake’s despatches are, however, available 
within collections of the despatches of Richard Wellesley.8 The more recent research on the 
period often offers very detailed accounts, such as those of Jac Weller, who notes his own 
experiences of the terrain in its present state when discussing a battlefield, and reveals 
understanding gained from personal examination of battlefields.9 However, in some cases these 
accounts can suffer from use of secondary sources. John Pemble, who provides excellent 
accounts and summations, mentions a critique of General Lake in which he mistakes Lake’s 
actions at the Battle of Laswari for those of the Battle of Delhi.10 Unfortunately, very few of these 
secondary sources are written from any perspective other than that of British public figures, or 
English speaking academics. As such, the scope of this research paper is limited by both an Anglo 
centric and analytical base of sources.  
 
The available primary sources are similarly Anglo-centric. However, as they were in several cases 
written by the policy makers and the officers involved, they are still of exceptional value. The 
despatches of Arthur Wellesley11 provide the bulk of the figures used within this research paper, 
as Arthur Wellesley kept meticulous count of his forces and supplies. In addition, Wellesley’s 
despatches provide a first-hand account of the major battles he led, from a command 
perspective. Likewise the despatches, correspondence and formal documents of Richard 
Wellesley, are used within this research paper to provide insight into the political aspects of the 
conflict. These are particularly useful as they include both formal documents such as treaties and 
similar official papers, as well as the correspondence and perspective of the Governor General of 
British India. Richard Wellesley’s correspondence12 also provides some of the written accounts of 
                                                          
8 A Selection of Despatches Treaties & Other Papers of the Marquess Wellesley, Edited by Sidney J. Owen, (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1877) 
9 Jac Weller, Wellington in India, (London, Longman group LTD, 1972) 
10 John Pemble, Resources and Techniques in the Second Maratha War, The Historical Journal, Vol. 19, No. 2 1976, 
p. 399. 
11 The Dispatches of Field Marhsall the Duke of Wellington during his various campaigns in India, Denmark, 
Portugal, Spain, The Low Countries, and France, from 1799 – 1818, Compiled by Lieut. Colonel Gurwood, vol 1, 
(London, John Murray, Albemarle Street 1837) 
12 A Selection of Despatches Treaties & Other Papers of the Marquess Wellesley, Edited by Sidney J. Owen, (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1877) 
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others who served in the campaign, most notably the despatches sent by General Lake. Arthur 
Wellesley’s introduction to the compilation of Richard Wellesley’s correspondence provides 
insight into how some among the officer class viewed the actions of Richard Wellesley, and the 
judgements placed upon those actions. These primary sources offer several useful perspectives 
although they lack any significant detail regarding the lives of non-officers under his command; 
as they are compilations some information will have been omitted.  
 
In light of the sources available, it can be expected that the views presented within this research 
papermay be somewhat skewed in favour of glorifying these key figures, as other historians have 
clearly done. However, that is not the intent of this research paper, the goal of which is to attempt 
to present the campaign from both the perspectives of its political causes and impacts, and its 
strategic trials and to reveal the impact of overcoming these various issues. In this manner the 
factors which culminated in the expansion of British India shall be revealed. 
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Political issues and Ideologies 
 
Political context 
The political climate in India at the beginning of the Mahratta campaign was a primary factor 
which led to the expansion of British influence within India. Of what had been the four major 
powers within India, the Mahrattas were the only remaining state which had the ability to oppose 
British expansion.13 The state of Mysore had fallen to the EIC, with its ruler the Tippoo Sultan 
defeated and slain defending his capital city of Seringapatam.14 The Nizam of Hyderbad had been 
weakened by previous encounters with the Mahrattas and had aligned himself with the EIC, and 
so was effectively under British dominion.15 The Mahrattas themselves were not aligned as a 
cohesive front against the EIC. The Peshwa, who had nominal rule of the Mahrattas although in 
practice little power at all, had sought British aid in being returned to power, rather than risk 
being permanently supplanted by one of the stronger Mahrattas such as Scindia, or Holkar.16 
Dawlut Rao Scindia’s relationship with the British was not a comfortable one, although he had 
agreed to assist the EIC against the rebel Dhoondiah Vagh in Mysore,17 there was little trust 
between him and the EIC.18 The Mahratta Jeswant Rao Holkar, being a Mahratta in the traditional 
sense, relied on the looting and raiding of his cavalry, an approach incompatible with British rule; 
Holkar, however, also had his own quarrels with Scindia.19 Bhonsla, Rajah of Berar, at the 
beginning of the Mahratta conflict was not overtly hostile to the EIC’s actions.20 The fourth 
Mahratta Gaikwar of Baroda had previously suffered at the hands of Scindia and the Peshwa, and 
was not involved in the fighting against the EIC at any point.21 The inability of the Mahrattas to 
                                                          
13 Wellesley, Introduction, Memorandum on Marquess Wellesley’s Government of India, p. ci; Ramsay Muir, The 
making of British India 1756 – 1858, Described in a series of Dispatches, Treaties, Statutes, and other documents, 
Selected and edited with introduction and notes, (London, Manchester university press, 1915) pp. 199 – 203. 
14 Weller, Wellington in India, pp. 80 – 81. 
15 Roberts, India under Wellesley, p. 81. 
16 Griffiths, The British Impact on India, p. 91. 
17 Huw, J. Davies, Wellington’s First Command: The Political and Military Campaign Against Dhoondiah Vagh, 
February – September 1800, Modern Asian Studies, 44, 5, 2010, 1087 – 1090  
18 Corrigan, Wellington a Military Life, p. 73. 
19 Roberts, India under Wellesley, p. 27. 
20 Ibid. p. 27. 
21 Ibid. p. 27. 
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form a cohesive front against the EIC played entirely into Richard Wellesley’s policy of utilising 
Indian rulers to defeat one another.22 Many of the minor Mahratta chieftains aided the EIC 
against Scindia.23 The EIC as it was at the beginning of this period of conflict, would have been 
unable to combat a cohesive front from the native peoples of India.  
 
British influence in India at the beginning of the period of expansion marked by Lord 
Mornington’s appointment in 1798, was limited to three key areas. The British held Bengal, the 
largest and the most profitable of the British held territories, which they governed from 
Calcutta.24 From 1796 Bengal possessed a standing army consisting of three battalions of 
European infantry, three regiments of European artillery, ten regiments of native cavalry and 
twenty-four battalions of native infantry.25 The British also governed Madras from Fort George, 
although this was a much smaller territory on the Coromandel coast.26 This territory possessed 
two battalions of European infantry, two regiments of European artillery, fifteen companies of 
native artillery, four regiments of native cavalry and twenty-two battalions of native infantry.27 
The third area of British influence was Bombay on the west coast of India, its influence limited to 
the city itself and the immediately surrounding area.28 The army of Bombay was the smallest of 
the three British forces, consisting only of eight battalions of native infantry, and which relied on 
local allies to supply both cavalry and artillery.29 These three territories each possessed a 
governor, with the governor of Bengal as Governor General.30 These territories were held by the 
EIC from the Moghul Emperor, although by the Mahratta war this relationship was no longer 
relevant to either party.31 
                                                          
22 Corrigan, Wellington a Military Life, p. 46. 
23 Edwardes, Glorious Sahibs, The romantic as empire-builder 1799 – 1838, p. 39; J, Malcolm, Major Malcolm to 
Lord Clive, Camp near Meritch, 3rd April, 1803, ‘The Dispatches of Field Marhsall the Duke of Wellington during his 
various campaigns in India, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, The Low Countries, and France, from 1799 – 1818’ Compiled 
by Lieut. Colonel Gurwood, first volume, (London, John Murray, Albemarle Street 1837) pp. 462 – 466. 
https://archive.org/stream/dispatchesindex01welluoft#page/n7/mode/2up  
24 Corrigan, Wellington a Military Life, p. 44. 
25 Corrigan, Wellington a Military Life, p. 45. 
26 Ibid. p. 45. 
27 Ibid. p. 45. 
28 Corrigan, Wellington a Military Life, p. 45; Roberts, India under Wellesley, p. 22. 
29 Corrigan, Wellington a Military Life, p. 45. 
30 Ibid. p. 45. 
31 Ibid. p. 44.  
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Richard Wellesley, Lord Mornington 
The character of Richard Wellesley, the Governor General of British India, Lord Mornington is 
central to any understanding of the political climate within India, and this period of British 
colonial expansion. Within this essay Richard Wellesley is referred to as the Governor General of 
British India, as opposed to Governor General of India, which, although often written as his title, 
is a presumption even by the end of his career. Richard Wellesley has often been referred to as 
India’s first British imperialist,32 and is responsible to a significant extent for the expansion of 
British influence in India. 
 
Richard Wellesley was one of three Wellesley brothers to serve in India. He was the eldest, 
followed by Arthur Wellesley, later to become the Duke of Wellington and Henry Wellesley, who 
was to serve as Richard’s personal secretary.33 Richard having already held several prominent 
roles as a public figure, was appointed Governor General of British India in May of 1798.34 During 
this time, the costs of maintaining the EIC expenses in administrating its Indian territories was 
strongly debated within Britain, and several viewpoints emerged in parliament and among the 
Company’s directors.35  
 
Relevant to these opinions was the extreme cost of governing and administering the EIC Indian 
territories. Arthur Wellesley relates these costs as having been 8,178,626£36, with a deficiency 
from the Indian revenues during times of peace of 332,530£. Arthur Wellesley also identifies the 
cost of maintaining the British garrisons as 1,996,487£ at Fort William, 1,868,498£ at Fort St 
George and 641,469£ in Bombay. Over half the cost of administering these Indian territories was 
that of maintaining standing forces, which, in spite of this significant cost, would still require 
                                                          
32Sir Percival Griffiths, The British Impact on India 
(London, Macdonald and Co, 1952) p. 88. 
33 P.E. Roberts, India under Wellesley, (London, Bell and Sons LTD, 1929) pp. 15-16. 
34Arthur Wellesley, Introduction, Memorandum on Marquess Wellesley’s Government of India, in A Selection of 
Despatches Treaties & Other Papers of the Marquess Wellesley, ed. by Sidney J. Owen, (Oxford, Clarendon Press 
1877) p. lxxiii. 
35 Thornton, History of British Empire in India III, pp. 2 – 4. 
36 Arthur Wellesley’s account uses the lower case l as the pound symbol, I have updated it to its current usage. 
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around six months to ready for full service in an emergency37. As a result of this expense there 
was an opinion that the EIC should revert to their role as traders with China, and abandon 
attempts at Indian administration. Another view was that the EIC should continue to hold and 
administer the territories they already controlled, but expand no further.38 These opinions were 
not solely based on economic justifications however, as there was also moral opposition to British 
colonial expansion.39 
 
Despite these debates, Richard Wellesley remained a proponent of policy supporting the 
expansion of British rule within India.40 Both Richard and Arthur Wellesley stress the threat of 
French colonialism. Richard Wellesley used this as justification for an expansionist policy and to 
justify not only the Mysore war41 which granted the EIC a substantive increase in lands and 
influence, but also as a primary justification of his campaign against the Mahrattas ,42 and for 
demanding the Nizam of Hyderbad remove French officers from his army and replace them with 
British officers.43 Whether or not this French threat was overstated is an issue of contention, as 
current historiography appears largely to support that by the ascendance of Richard Wellesley, 
the French were able to bring very little power to bear within India44. That is not to say that there 
were no French designs on Indian territories, but that they were not in a strong enough position 
to achieve their goals.45 It is often stated that Richard Wellesley merely used fear of French 
Colonialism as a convenient excuse, this rather cynical view appears to do Richard Wellesley a 
disservice, as his correspondence provides evidence that he considered the French to be a 
                                                          
37 Wellesley, Introduction, Memorandum on Marquess Wellesley’s Government of India, p. lxxiv. 
38 Gordon Corrigan, Wellington a Military Life, (London Hambledon and London, 2001) p. 43. 
39 Roberts, India under Wellesley, pp. 37 – 40. 
40 Corrigan, Wellington a Military Life, p. 43. 
41 Roberts, India under Wellesley, p. 44. 
42 Roberts, India under Wellesley, p. 212; Corrigan, Wellington a Military Life, pp. 45 – 47. 
43 Corrigan, Wellington a Military Life, p.69; Roberts, India under Wellesley, pp. 80 – 81. 
44 Corrigan, Wellington a Military Life, p. 43. 
45 Roberts, India under Wellesley, pp. 30 - 31. 
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legitimate concern.46 The views of Richard Wellesley can be seen as a driving force for the 
expansion of British Influence within India.47 
 
British relationships with native rulers 
Although the British nominally held their power from the Moughul Emperor Shah Allam, it is clear 
that the position of the emperor was by this point almost entirely ceremonial.48 Shah Allam had 
in fact been captured and blinded previously by Gholaum Kaudir Khan, a Rohilla Chief. Shah Allam 
had been in a sense rescued by Scindia, but his position was still in effect little more than a 
prisoner.49 As a result the Peshwa ruled nominally in his stead, although his position was little 
better.50 At the end of the wars against Scindia, Bhonsla and Holkar both the position of the 
Peshwa and that of Shah Hallam relied on British protection and support.51 Shah Allam 
attempted, without success, to maintain his nominal role as overlord by granting General Lake 
the state titles of ‘the Sword of the State, the Hero of the Land, the Lord of the Age, and Victorious 
in War’.52 In this manner Shah Allam can be seen to be attempting to include the British 
conquerors as subjects of his empire, as the Moghuls had often done.53 However, it was clear 
that as he accepted British protection, he was no longer an independent ruler, and any claim that 
the British held their territories from the Moghul Empire were effectively quashed.54 
 
Power within the Mahratta confederacy was rarely stable, and this allowed the EIC to expand 
without facing unified opposition. The relationship between the EIC and the Peshwa, Baji Rao 
                                                          
46 Richard Wellesley, 'Minute of the Governor-General in the Secret Department', Despatches of the Marquess 
Wellesley, pp. 11 – 57; Richard Wellesley, 'The Earl of Mornington to Tippoo Sultan', Despatches of the Marquess 
Wellesley, pp. 57 – 59; Richard Wellesley, 'Treaty of Bassein', Despatches of the Marquess Wellesley, pp. 233 – 244; 
Richard Wellesley, 'The Earl of Mornington to the Honourable the Court of Directors', Despatches of the Marquess 
Wellesley pp. 96 – 105. 
47 Griffiths, The British Impact on India, p. 88. 
48 Ibid. p. 45. 
49 Edward Thornton, History of British Empire in India III, (London, Wm. H. Allen and Co., 1842) pp. 322 – 324. 
50 Ibid.  p. 323. 
51 Ibid. p. 326. 
52 Michael Edwardes, Glorious Sahibs, The romantic as empire-builder 1799 – 1838  
(London, Eyre and Spottiswood, 1968) p. 39. 
53 Ibid. p. 39. 
54 Roberts, India under Wellesley, p. 226. 
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was complex and had been controversial at points. On the fourteenth of October 180155 Scindia 
and Holkar fought in order to expand their control over the Peshwa, a contest which Scindia won, 
and which reduced Baji Rao to little more than a figurehead, and in effect a prisoner.56 However 
in October 1802, Holkar with forces often commanded by British officers, defeated both the 
armies of the Peshwa and of Scindia and placed Amrut Rao on the throne.57 Baji Rao applied for 
help from Lord Mornington, offering to accept any and all terms from the EIC for his protection 
and return to power.58 Lord Mornington, in spite of advice from others to let the Mahrattas fight 
amongst themselves, or attempt to gain support of some of the other Mahrattas or even to 
decline support to Baji Rao and instead support Amrut Rao, who was by all accounts a more 
competent man,59 elected instead to assist Baji Rao.60 The Peshwa did not request British 
assistance entirely of his own volition. The reports of Major John Malcolm reveal that he advised 
waiting until the Peshwa feared for his life before offering assistance, to make the most political 
gain.61 This culminated in the signing of the Treaty of Bassein on December 31st 1802.62 Several 
sources, more likely to glorify the Wellesley brothers,63 present a perspective, without any 
recognition that the Peshwa was under significant duress. Whether this was a deliberate 
omission on the part of those writing, or just not considered worthy of attention is unclear. 
However it seems entirely relevant that the plight of the Peshwa was in some part by the design 
of the EIC and its agents,64 and that their support of the Peshwa was not as altruistic as some 
historians have suggested.65 The terms of the treaty itself reveal exactly how altruistic were the 
motives of the EIC. The result of which being that the Peshwa would allow for and maintain six 
battalions of EIC soldiers within his territories, would accept British mediation, and would not 
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enter into diplomatic talks with other powers Native or otherwise, and that many of his rights 
would be transferred to the company.66 
 
The political power of the British was further strengthened with the return of the Peshwa to 
power, by British force of arms under British protection. In 1803 it was agreed that the Peshwa, 
Baji Rao, was to be restored to his seat of power at Poona, and Arthur Wellesley was tasked with 
leading an army through Mahratta territory in order to facilitate this.67 The force, which is 
revealed by Wellesley’s correspondence, consisted of 10,617 men.68 Arthur Wellesley’s force 
made it through the Deccan and reached Poona on the 20th of April, the Peshwa reached Poona 
on the 13th of May69 after Arthur Wellesley declared it safe for him to arrive.70 On returning the 
Peshwa to his position, he was declared as ‘his Highness, Baji Rao, Pandit Pradhan Bahadur.’, the 
title of Peshwa conspicuous by its absence.71 The size of Wellesley’s force, and the fact that it 
was sent separately to the person of the Peshwa himself indicates that there was some concern 
that this move would be opposed. It was hoped that the other Mahratta leaders would accept 
the treaty of Bassein and not move to obstruct it, Wellesley was communicating with Holkar at 
the time by correspondence.72 However Holkar, Scindia and Bhonsla all opposed this treaty, 
Scindia on the grounds that, as one of the signatories of the treaty of Salbai, which he claimed to 
still be in force, he had a right to be consulted.73 Scindia and Bhonsla then combined their armies, 
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and the British, after failing to convince Scindia, Bhonsla and Holkar to accept the treaty of 
Bassein, declared war.74 
  
The threat of French colonialism in India 
The primary justification for the period of expansion which culminated in the Mahratta campaign 
was the perceived risk of French colonialism. As there had previously been significant contest in 
India between the French and British, this threat occupied a place of concern in the colonial 
British mind-set.75 That this threat was taken seriously is made clear through the consistent 
demands of the EIC to the major powers in India to remove all French officers from their 
employ.76 When this condition was not met it was often used as a justification for war, this was 
one of the factors inducing the British to go to war with Scindia, as there were voiced concerns 
that his infantry was trained by French officers77. The Mysore war against the Tippoo Sultan was 
influenced by claims that the Tippoo was seeking a French alliance, and that the French in 
Mauritius had offered this,78 with details being publicly proclaimed.79 Even those ostensibly allies 
of the EIC were viewed with suspicion until they removed French influence from their ranks. A 
notable example of this being the case of the Nizam of Hyderbad, although it is reported that he 
also was concerned about the growing power of his French officers, and desired their removal.80 
The fears of the Nizam, were based on the incompatibility of his rule with the ideals of many of 
the French officers. Some of these French officers marched the Nizam’s troops under the 
Tricolour. Even the Nizam was concerned that the revolutionary ideals of liberty and equality may 
lead his French officers to turn his own soldiers against him.81 It is commonly argued that this 
French threat was overplayed, and that even with Napoleon’s plans to invade India from Egypt, 
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the actual chance of French success was severely limited.82 However, although the French threat 
came to nothing, this does not mean the threat itself was not significant, simply that the 
measures taken by the EIC were effective.83 In the case of war, it is unwise to underestimate any 
foe, and the cost of underestimating the French, so successful in Europe, could have been 
devastating.84  
 
Political controversies 
The EIC was also not wholly cohesive. As a result of what Lord Mornington considered to be a 
slight to his reputation, he attempted to resign and return to England in 180385. This was the 
result of a scandal relating to the finances allotted to his brother Arthur Wellesley as a political 
officer. Lord Mornington replied rather tartly to suggestions that he cut some of the money from 
Arthur Wellesley’s expenses that if it was believed that the Governer General of India could use 
his influence for the betterment of his family then they had best recall both himself and Arthur 
Wellesley immediately.86 Although the matter was dropped Lord Mornington’s actions were far 
from universally supported. After the effective rout of Monson’s forces by Holkar87, the EIC’s 
directors were able to force Lord Mornington’s withdrawal from India in 1805.88 Lord Mornington 
returned to England, where the directors of the EIC attempted to colour him as an uncontrollable 
despot, however, he was able to adequately defend himself and was victorious in parliament by 
majority.89 Lord Mornington was not to return to India as Governor General, and his time in India 
can be seen as the height of his achievement, as he was instrumental to the expansion of British 
India.90 
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Logistical difficulties faced by British forces campaigning in India 
 
The logistical difficulties which an army styled in the European fashion faced campaigning in India 
were a significant hurdle to the expansion of British India. The greatest of these issues was the 
problem of supplying an army and all of its camp followers. There was a necessity for a significant 
number of bullocks to tow field guns and carry supplies, and also to carry fodder for the bullocks 
themselves. In the case of the war against the Mahrattas, there was the risk that the Mahrattas 
would fight as they always had, with an entire army mounted, cutting off supply lines and 
adopting a scorched earth policy as they withdrew. In this way, they avoided the need to maintain 
their own supply lines, and were able to utilise local resources then destroy these so that the 
enemy had no access to them. Added to this threat was the danger of campaigning too long, as 
to campaign in the monsoon season meant sickness and movement slowed and often halted, 
with many rivers as good as impassable. 
 
Supply lines and Bullocks 
In order to maintain a campaign involving large bodies of infantry, a clear supply line is essential. 
The geographical features in the Indian setting made this particularly difficult.  The campaigns 
led by the EIC and in particular by Arthur Wellesley in these conflicts attempted to overcome 
some of these limitations. The use of large numbers of bullocks to transport food, supplies and 
field guns, although not new, saw these utilised much more efficiently.91 This has often been 
argued as a result of Arthur Wellesley’s professionalisation of the bullock train and suppliers 
contracted to provide grain.92  More recent historiography argues against the perception of 
Arthur Wellesley as ‘The logistical architect of the British Indian army’.93 This was in recognition 
that the actions of Arthur Wellesley, in attempting to impose stricter rules and penalties on 
suppliers and labourers, in many ways showed something of a lack of understanding relating to 
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the business culture within the region.94 This is evident when Wellesley’s demands were met not 
with acceptance, but responses designed to make them practicable.95 The arguments provided 
against the value of Arthur Wellesley’s influence are opposed by a significant number of 
secondary sources, which attempt to paint Arthur Wellesley as a logistical and military genius.96 
It is unclear which are more compelling, as the British military within India was able to prepare 
for campaign more quickly under Arthur Wellesley than previously. Most dissent focuses on the 
period shortly before the Mahratta war in 1802. It can be argued that focus ought to be placed 
on Wellesley’s first independent command against Dhoondia Singh in Mysore, where his theories 
on war and supply were largely developed and tested.97  
 
Regardless of whether or not this system of supply was revolutionary or new, it was certainly 
effective. This allowed for the British forces to overcome a key difficulty regarding the expansion 
of British influence, through allowing for faster travel. This limited the concern of having supply 
lines cut and so lowered the risk of an embarrassing defeat. It is claimed that twelve of the 
heavier bullocks bred from the farms of the Tippoo Sultan were able to transport six pounder 
field guns faster than the infantry could march.98 Wellesley’s supply columns contained between 
six and eight thousand bullocks, each of which carried one hundred and twenty pounds of 
supplies which covering eight miles in a day.99 These columns were well defended to deter raiding 
of the supply lines by Mahratta forces.100 Wellesley also banned officer’s baggage wagons so that 
officers would have to carry their supplies on more mobile pack animals, and chose not to bring 
the heavier siege artillery which would have slowed progress.101 The result of these measures 
allowed Wellesley’s forces to march at around twenty miles a day, a significant improvement on 
previous campaigns where British soldiers had only been able to manage five.102 Wellesley’s own 
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notes relating to his provisions are very clear and detailed, including numbers of bullocks 
required with which supplies, as well as requests relating to the number of coolies to load and 
unload supplies.103 
 
The problem of infantry 
A serious logistical concern was that, as the majority of the British led force was infantry, they 
would be entirely unable to confront the more agile forces of the Mahrattas.104 The Mahrattas 
traditional method of warfare was large amounts of light cavalry, able to raid and withdraw at 
leisure.105 Described as natural guerrilla fighters,106 the forces of the Mahrattas were expected 
to take something of a scorched earth tactic, burning supplies and withdrawing all the while 
raiding and living off the terrain, and so fighting a war of attrition.107 The Mahratta Holkar did 
indeed do this in the later conflict, and as a result gained a significant victory over the forces of 
Monson.108 The British led forces were poorly suited to combata traditional Mahratta army. The 
actions taken to counteract this by the army of Arthur Wellesley were to carry less in the way of 
supplies and baggage, and to only take comparatively light field guns.109 The forces of General 
Lake, however, had less to be concerned about in this regard, as they were to march upon 
fortified cities, like Delhi, against a force primarily consisting of French trained infantry, and as 
such limited in the same manner.110   
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Mahratta advantages 
The cavalry of the Mahrattas had the reputation of being fierce and mobile. Not known for supply 
lines, Mahratta armies tended to live off the land, taking what they needed as they travelled111. 
It was considered remarkable by many of the native population that the British forces did not 
raid as they marched to fight the Mahrattas, but instead paid locally for supplies.112 The 
traditional advantage of the Mahratta army, was its large number of cavalry; these forces were 
not bogged down by artillery and infantry, but were capable of advancing and withdrawing at 
speed.113 In this manner, a Mahratta army could string out an invading army until it was 
weakened by the monsoon season, then harry it as it withdrew inflicting significant casualties. 
However, several of the Mahrattas had ceased to rely on this traditional method of fighting. 
Scindia and Bhonsla had adopted the use of large bodies of European trained infantry, and large 
numbers of heavy cannon.114 Even Holkar, often considered to have fought in a more traditional 
manner, had significant numbers of infantry and artillery with which he inflicted the most 
damage on his weakened enemies.115 This severely limited the Mahrattas ability to avoid the 
British forces and harry their supply lines, and indeed convinced the Mahrattas to meet the 
British led forces in battle.116 Arthur Wellesley spoke highly of the Mahratta infantry, noting that 
he considered them to be the best he had seen in India, other than the British led forces. But De 
Boigne, the French officer who founded Scindia’s infantry brigades, was noted to have advised 
Scindia to not attempt to meet the British led forces in battle in their own manner.117 Many 
historians have claimed, that by improving their infantry, the Mahrattas severely weakened their 
cavalry and so lost their traditional advantage.118 However, the Mahratta infantry, even that of 
Holkar, can be seen to have significantly outperformed their cavalry of the Mahrattas in the 
conflict.119 
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Camp followers  
A further problem of maintaining a campaign in the European style, was the issue of camp 
followers, which slowed a force and required supplies. Numerous accounts are given regarding 
camp followers and the veritable bazaar which they set up alongside the forces on campaign.  
This was particularly evident with the Mahratta forces, although similarly when British forces 
halted, merchants and suppliers would also set up.120 It is stated that for every soldier, there 
were around ten non-combatant followers.121 These camp followers included merchants, the 
wives of officers and soldiers, grooms and grass cutters for the cavalry and those who handled 
and led the bullocks.122 However, with the strict measures imposed by Arthur Wellesley, these 
additional bodies did not prevent the British forces from making good time. 
 
The Monsoon 
Any force campaigning in India during this time, had to be very aware of the monsoon season. 
With the monsoon came sickness, roads reduced to mud and flooding which made the fording of 
rivers next to impossible.123 It was generally accepted that armies did not campaign in the 
monsoon season.124 However, Arthur Wellesley ignored this; he mitigated the risks by 
maintaining supply and imposing strict orders regarding hygiene, and demanding that barracks, 
when they were available, be kept clean and be both well ventilated and spacious.125 Although 
there was still little understanding of cholera, and its method of transmission, Wellesley seems 
to have understood the necessity of good drinking water.126 The British led forces planned the 
route of their marches to be near rivers in order to ensure the supply of fresh water, and also 
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attempted to maintain boats on any river which was likely to require crossing.127 An example of 
this being the preparation of the Godavari River; Wellesley had made several bridges from boats 
which he left strongly guarded so that his force could cross at will.128 In this way several of the 
difficulties associated with travelling in the monsoon season were overcome. 
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Strategic concerns of the campaign against Scindia and Bhonsla in the 
Deccan and its major battles 
 
The strategic actions of the EIC’s campaign against Scindia and Bhonsla, in the Deccan increased 
British influence and prestige within India. The defeat of numerically superior forces possessing 
greater artillery, added to a myth of British invincibility. This began with the capture of 
Ahmednuggur and culminated in several major battles. These major military actions were of 
paramount importance to expansion of British India. It was through months of campaigning that 
the power of the major Mahrattas was broken, after the Peshwa was restored to his seat at 
Poona. Although the two primary campaigns happened simultaneously, the campaign in the 
South led by Major General Arthur Wellesley was particularly significant, as it was fought against 
Scindia and Bhonsla in person. During this campaign Arthur Wellesley defeated the forces of 
Scindia and Bhonsla in several battles. These actions, coupled with General Lake’s actions in the 
North, resulted in the capitulation of Scindia and Bhonsla, as the military might of these chiefs 
was broken.  
 
Outline of forces 
Four armies were sent forth by the EIC of which two saw battle, 129 these were separated into 
two divisions.130 The armies sent to Hindustan in the North were led by General Lake and the 
division sent to the Deccan was commanded by Arthur Wellesley.131 The forces allotted to Arthur 
Wellesley were the same as those used to restore the Peshwa, with additional native forces 
supplied by the Peshwa. The EIC forces were described in detailed official correspondence 
received by Arthur Wellesley from Lieut. General Stuart. This correspondence states that 
Wellesley’s division would contain a force of cavalry, infantry and artillery.  This included 412 of 
H.M. 19th Light Dragoons, of British cavalry, as well as 1297 troopers of the 4th , 5th and 6th Native 
cavalry’s, leaving Wellesley with a total of 1709 troopers. In terms of infantry, Wellesley 
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commanded 1767 soldiers from H.M. 74th Regiment and the Scotch brigade and 6,123 Sepoys in 
terms of Native Infantry, from the 1st Battalion’s 2nd, 3rd and 8th Regiments of Native Infantry, and 
the 2nd Battalion’s 3rd, 12th, and 18th Regiments of Native Infantry. A total of 6,123 soldiers in the 
infantry. This force was supported with an additional 1,018 artillerymen, Pioneers and Gun 
Lascars. Wellesley’s division at the outset of the conflict was 10,617 men.132 These forces were 
supplemented as the campaign went on and lesser Mahrattas also fought alongside him, the 
overall number of Wellesley’s forces in the Deccan is considered to have been around 21,000 
divided between Wellesley and Colonel Stevenson.133 The size of this army reveals the significant 
expense which the EIC was willing to commit in both manpower and money to expand their 
influence.  
 
The forces of the Mahrattas have been noted as having been in all cases superior to the British 
led forces in numbers and artillery. Scindia’s forces at Assaye are generally placed at around 
16,000 to Wellesley’s 4,500134 although some sources argue the force more likely consisted of 
around 20,000 regular troops135. The whole of Scindia’s army at the outbreak of war is generally 
considered to have been around 37,000 men and 330 field guns.136 Bhonsla contributed between 
10,000 and 12,000 men, although some sources list this as low as 6000; this force would have 
consisted of infantry artillery and cavalry.137 The accounts given in Wellesley’s despatches of the 
forces of Scindia and Bhonsla make the armies out to be significantly larger than this, with 
Scindia’s force listed as containing over 20,000 cavalry, just over 8,000 infantry and 205 field funs 
of which 35 are listed as heavy field pieces.138 The same piece of correspondence lists Bhonsala’s 
forces as 20,000 cavalry, 6,000 infantry, thirty five field pieces, and 500 rockets.139 This would 
place the forces of the Scindia and Bhonsla at over 54,000 in terms of infantry and cavalry and is 
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likely an excessive figure, as it relies on all of the Mahrattas brigades and regiments being at full 
strength. It is noted in the letter that the exact number of the Mahratta forces in not clear.140 In 
total the Mahrattas are likely to have fielded around 56,000 regular troops between 1803 and 
1805 whereas the British led forces would have fielded around 37,000.141 This rough outline of 
forces reveals that although the Mahrattas did field more than the EIC, the difference in numbers 
was not particularly exceptional.  
 
The siege of Ahmednuggur 
The capture of Ahmednuggur was a significant moment in this campaign as it provided both a 
defensible position to protect supplies and deprived Scindia of a powerful position. This was of 
great logistical importance and the ease of its capture added to the myth of British invincibility. 
The initial attack on Scindia’s fortress of Ahmednuggur, was undertaken on the eighth of August 
1803, having been delayed a day by light monsoon rains.142 Arthur Wellesley’s own account 
provides details of the siege of Ahmednuggur, where upon arrival Wellesley requested that the 
Killidar in command surrender the fort.143 This was refused, and the defenders were noted as 
having been ‘a body of Arabs’ and a battalion of Scindia’s regular infantry.144 These forces are 
elsewhere described as having been one thousand each of Arab mercenaries and white clad 
sepoys along with five small brass guns commanded by French officers.145 The walls of the 
surrounding town, Wellesley carried by escalade, with three attacking forces, in this way taking 
advantage of the limited number of defenders who were attempting to hold a wall of around 
4000 yards146, this led the defenders to retreat to houses from where they continued to fire upon 
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Wellesley’s force147. As the wall lacked a rampart, however, the initial assault left those who 
climbed ladder with nowhere to go once they reached the top, where they came under fire from 
the forts defenders.148 The assault was then moved from the undefended wall to the bastions 
which covered it, which were quickly taken.149 An oft repeated report of the siege from an officer 
of the Peshwa, who had attended the battle described the actions of the British  
 
“The English are a strange people, and their General a wonderful man. They came here in the 
morning, looked at the pettah wall, walked over it, killed the garrison, and returned to breakfast! 
What can withstand them?”150 
 
This quote in many ways reveals the audacity of the British assault, on a strong position, and the 
way in which this incident contributed to the legend of British invincibility.151 The town was taken, 
the garrison cut off from the fortress, and the siege of the fort itself was to begin.  
 
The walls of the fort of Ahmednuggur were higher and stronger than those of the surrounding 
city, however they were old, and had stood for almost three hundred years.152 This made the 
conquest of the city even more significant, as it strengthened the identity of the British as a 
superior martial power. Wellesley’s force set up a battery of four twelve pounder guns, which 
inflicted significant damage to the surrounding wall.153 Wellesley’s despatches state that his 
battery began firing on the 10th, and had such a great effect the forts Killidar sought a reprieve 
that same day, however, Wellesley refused to stop firing until the fort was surrendered or taken, 
and on the day of the 11th the defenders sent a message that they would surrender as long as 
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the garrison was allowed to go free, which was accepted.154 The detailed account offered by 
Weller, states that the defenders only surrendered after a breach was formed and Wellesley’s 
troops prepared to storm it.155 Wellesley states that the losses from his force were trifling, and 
that they were due to the spirit of their own attacks.156 He gives the numbers of losses from his 
force as 18 Europeans killed including two captains, and 61 wounded, as well as 12 of his native 
troops killed and 50 wounded.157 The capture of this fortress allowed Wellesley to have a secure 
base of operations for his campaign which could safely accumulate supplies and so limit the risks 
of having his lines of supply cut,158 while depriving Scindia’s forces of a significant resource. 
Wellesley sent a despatch the very day after taking the fort on the 13th immediately requesting 
significant supplies to be sent to provision the fortress, including 750 bullock loads of supplies to 
the fortress for immediate consumption, and instructions requesting additional troops to replace 
the wounded who he was to leave in Ahmednuggur under Captain Graham.159 
 
The Battle of Assaye 
The next challenge faced was attempting to bring the Mahratta forces to battle. The forces of 
General Wellesley and Colonel Stevenson advanced, Colonel Stevenson succeeding in keeping 
the Mahratta forces from raiding in the territory of the Nizam and at one point cut the Mahratta 
supply lines all the while attempting to manoeuvre the Mahratta forces into a position that would 
require them to do battle.160 Wellesley and Stevenson continued onwards via different routes 
and the two planned to connect and attack Scindia’s forces at Borkardan around midmorning on 
the 24th of September.161 Wellesley, arriving at Naulniah on the 23rd, received intelligence stating 
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that the forces of Scindia and Bhonsla were preparing to depart and that their cavalry had already 
done so.162 Wellesley, not wishing to let the infantry of these combined armies escape, set off in 
pursuit without waiting for Stevenson’s forces to arrive intending to attack the Mahratta force.163 
After marching to this location, Wellesley’s force located the entirety of Scindia and Bhonsla’s 
combined army.164 Wellesley, although arriving on the enemy’s left, decided it would be better 
to attack upon the right, and so forded the Kaitna river165 which his native scouts had declared 
to have no ford166 in order to better position his force and prevent them from needing to attack 
an enemy arrayed behind a river with steep banks.167 The Mahratta forces repositioned to face 
this assault and began to fire their heavy cannon, an early shot removing the head of one of 
Wellesley’s gallopers.168 By Wellesley’s own account his forces formed a line to face that of the 
Mahratta’s and attacked immediately into the fire of the Mahratta’s heavy cannon.169 This was 
the beginning of the Battle of Assaye, which is the most well recorded of any battles in the 
campaign. The battle was significant as not only did it result in the rout of the combined force of 
Scindia and Bhonsla, but the entire battle was fought with only half of Wellesley’s army.  
 
While Wellesley’s force was forming up to attack, his fourteen field guns170 engaged the 
Mahratta’s artillery. Wellesley’s artillery was reported to have suffered greatly from the 
overwhelming firepower of the Mahratta’s more numerous and heavier artillery.171 The Mahratta 
army was commanded by a European officer Colonel Pohlmann, and consisted of 13 regular 
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battalions of infantry and around 60 field guns.172 By the time the British led force had begun to 
advance, not a single British field gun was firing and the force of the Mahratta artillery was 
focused on Wellesley’s six battalions.173 The Kings 78th Highlanders were the first to reach the 
Mahratta guns, where they are reputed to have stopped sixty yards from the guns, fired, reloaded 
and charged with fixed bayonets, all in an orderly and parade like fashion before moving on to 
repeat this action against the Mahratta infantry behind the guns.174 This action, repeated by 
consecutive battalions of sepoy infantry, is considered to have been the leading cause of the 
Mahratta soldiers retreat and reveals the extreme discipline and training of the British force.175 
This action of the 78th is often glorified at the expense of the similar action taken by the sepoy 
battalions, who are often not mentioned.176 However, without the well trained EIC sepoys the 
British would not have had significant forces to engage the Mahrattas. The discipline exhibited 
by the British led force in marching in good order into overwhelming fire then charging a force of 
superior numbers, would have had a significant psychological effect on the Mahratta forces, or 
indeed any other forces.177 The 74th unfortunately did not fare as well, as their line of march 
drifted towards the fortified town of Assaye where they suffered heavy losses against a 
significant number of guns and matchlock muskets.178 This battalion suffered serious casualties, 
up to ninety percent in the advance company and were unable to move closer to the position 
than around one hundred yards, at which point they withdrew to a short distance and formed a 
square to defend against the two battalions of infantry and the force of Mahratta cavalry which 
attacked them.179 The 74th were saved by a charge of the 19th light dragoons and the 4th and 5th 
native cavalry which cleared the Mahratta forces from Assaye.180 Wellesley mentions in his 
dispatches that Lieut. Colonel Maxwell led this charge and was responsible for the rout of the 
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Mahratta forces on this flank, although he was killed in the action.181 Wellesley then re-formed 
his force, and returned to mop up the last of the Mahratta gunners who had returned to their 
weapons after the 78th and sepoy battalions had moved on.182  
 
Wellesley also notes the ferocity of the battle by pointing out that nearly all the British officers 
had horses shot out from underneath them.183 The British forces losses at the Battle of Assaye 
are given in detail by Wellesley; he lost 164 European troops killed, of which seven were ranked 
captain or above and 411 wounded and eight missing. From the native troops he lists 245 killed 
of which 21 were native officers, the wounded numbered at 1211 of which 67 were native 
officers.184 Wellesley lists the guns captured from the Mahratta army as seven brass howitzers, 
69 brass guns, and 22 iron guns. The iron guns Wellesley destroyed, and the brass guns moved 
to a place of safety.185 Wellesley lists the Mahratta losses at 1200 killed and an unknown number 
wounded scattered about the country.186 This was a decisive battle for the forces of Wellesley, 
as even without Stevenson’s force, Wellesley routed the combined forces of Scindia and Bhonsla. 
Although the majority of their army survived, it can be argued that their morale never recovered 
from this significant defeat. Scindia’s infantry was shattered and he made a truce with Wellesley 
which would have left his force largely out of the remainder of the conflict.187 This defeat 
contributing to the concept of British invincibility.188 Scindia later broke this truce to support 
Bhonsla with his cavalry at the battle of Argaum.189 Additionally, the artillery lost by Scindia and 
Bhonsla’s force represented significant cost, and allowed Wellesley to withdraw some of his 
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infantry from Poona, as he believed it unlikely that any artillery would be able to threaten Poona 
after such a loss.190 
 
The Battle of Argaum and culmination of the campaign 
The Battle of Assaye left the forces of Wellesley and Stevenson unable to pursue the defeated 
Mahratta force for several days, as they needed to stay and care for the wounded.191 After 
eventually pursuing the armies of Scindia and Bhonsla, a treaty was signed with Scindia, in which 
it was made clear that Scindia’s army and the EIC would not do battle as long as Scindia withdrew 
his armies to Ellichpoor.192 Arthur Wellesley appears to have been certain that this agreement 
however did not include the forces of Bhonsla, and so continued to pursue Bhonsla’s army.193 
Arthur Wellesley writes that he accepted this cessation of hostilities within the Deccan, but would 
not extend them into Hindustan. This was because he had no further power to injure Scindia, as 
he had already taken all that he had within the Deccan and that Scindia’s army now only consisted 
of horse, which could cause some mischief if left to their own devices.194 A further and more 
political reason for this being that in dealing only with Scindia, the interests of Scindia and 
Bhonsla would be separated.195  
 
Wellesley then brought his forces against those of Bhonsla. The result of this was the destruction 
of any hostile Mahratta force in the Deccan, at very little cost to Wellesley’s own force. On the 
30th November, Arthur Wellesley reports that on the previous day he had attacked the forces of 
Scindia and Bhonsla, the Rajah of Berar on the plains of Argaum and that he has taken from them 
their artillery and killed many at little cost to his own forces.196 Wellesley later reports that the 
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forces of Bhonsla formed up in a line of about five miles, with their guns and infantry to the left 
of the armies centre and Scindia’s cavalry occupying the right.197 Wellesley formed his army into 
two lines, which met and despatched a force of cavalry after which the entire Mahratta line 
retired in disorder, leaving 38 cannon to be captured by the Wellesley’s force.198 Wellesley 
despatched his cavalry to pursue the beaten foe which chased them by moonlight as the battle 
had been fought late in the day.199 Wellesley notes that his losses were minimal, consisting of 
only 15 European soldiers killed, 160 wounded and among his native troops, only 31 killed with 
148 wounded.200 With this battle the primary forces of Scindia and Bhonsla were routed with 
minimal losses, which allowed for the siege and capture of the fort of Gawilghur.201 From this 
point on the war in the Deccan was in effect concluded. 
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General Lake’s campaign against Scindia’s forces in Hindustan 
 
The campaign of General Lake, Commander in Chief of the British forces, was fought in Hindustan 
and had a significant bearing on the expansion of British India. There is less information available 
relating to this campaign as Lake has not been glorified to the same extent as Arthur Wellesley, 
and so less of his despatches are available. General Lake defeated the French led forces of Scindia 
at the battle of Delhi and as a result captured the city of Delhi and with that, the person of the 
Moghul Emperor Shah Hallam.  Lake’s second major battle, the battle of Laswari resulted in 
Scindia’s powers in Hindustan being broken, and was a pivotal point in the eventual capitulation 
of Scindia to the EIC. 
 
French forces in Hindustan 
General Lake’s campaign and the actions of his French counterparts severely weakened the 
position of the French as a colonial power within India. Lake’s campaign began well, his forces 
setting off from Cawnpore towards the fort of Aligarh on the 7th of August a day before 
Wellesley’s force set off to capture Ahmednuggar.202 Lake reached Mahratta territory by the 29th 
and captured the fort of Aligarh on the 4th of September.203 The French Commandant of Algarh 
opened up negotiations with Lake upon his arrival, but was arrested by his Mahratta second in 
command.204 The weakening of French authority and the respect in which they were held 
becoming apparent at the very beginning of the campaign. This led to Lake’s storming the fort 
with a loss of around 260 men killed or wounded, including 17 officers205  compared to an 
estimated 2000 from the garrison206 General Perron had some 15,000 men with which to oppose 
Lake, although he appeared reluctant to engage.207 By the 7th of September Lake was informed 
that Perron had quit the service of Scindia and was requesting British protection and safe passage 
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to Lucknow.208 In this way Perron maintained the considerable wealth he had amassed in the 
service of Scindia,209 by offering to resolve without further conflict this section of the 
campaign.210 This action by Perron weakened the reputation of French officers in India 
considerably.211  
 
The Battle of Delhi 
Lake’s actions at the Battle of Delhi were to have lasting significance, as they again revealed 
British martial prowess and weakened the positions of the French as a colonial power by lowering 
their prestige significantly. This battle also resulted in British gaining the person of the Emperor 
Shah Hallam when the British captured Delhi, the titular ruler of the Mahratta’s. Perron was 
replaced by another French officer, Louis Bourquin, an officer of some infamy, initially a cook and 
manufacturer of fireworks.212 Lake engaged Bourquin’s forces on the 11th of September, in a 
battle known as the battle of Delhi.213 Lake’s account of the battle reveals that the day was taken 
in the face of heavy cannon fire. 
 
 “…such a fire of cannon as has seldom been seen if ever,”214  
 
Lake’s soldiers marched into this heavy fire, fired a single volley and then charged and put the 
enemy to flight, after which point Lake’s soldiers opened up and allowed the cavalry to charge 
through them. The cavalry pursued Bourquin’s troops and inflicted heavy casualties.215 Lake also 
notes in another letter that his cavalry pushed the fleeing forces into the Jumna River, where 
many drowned.216 When offering the statistics of the battle to the Governor General, Lake states 
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that the losses to his force were very great. He explains these were the result of advancing into 
the fierce cannonade of Bourquin’s artillery, and the number of foes arrayed against his own 
force.217 Lake places the numbers involved at around 4,500 men all up in his force, and claims 
that Bourquin’s force numbered at least four times that number.218 Lake also cites a deficiency 
in his cavalry as a reason for such heavy losses, but goes on to commend the actions of all of his 
forces involved and states that the battle was won by the bravery of every man making up his 
force.219 The result of this battle was that the French reputation within India was further 
damaged, and the reputation of the British undoubtedly strengthened. This was in part due to 
the fleeing force of Bourquin which plundered much of the country side, and after their defeat 
were in turn attacked by those they had plundered.220 Additionally, this battle led to Lake’s 
capture of Delhi, and as a result, the Moghul Emperor Shah Allam being taken under British 
protection.221  
 
The Battle of Laswari 
After the battle of Delhi Lake’s force consolidated their control of the surrounding region, in much 
the same manner as Wellesley’s force to the South. Lake mentions in his dispatches the efforts 
made towards consolidation of the region. 222 Lake also mentions what he perceived to be the 
immense difficulty of rendering the vast province safe and productive with the limited force he 
possessed, and notes that a larger standing army would be required in the future to administer 
the area.223 This reveals British intent to not only defeat the Mahratta forces, but also to conquer 
and administer their territories, and the long term view held by General Lake.  
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Lake’s next action of serious import, was the Battle of Laswari, at which Lake attacked and 
defeated 15 regular Battalions sent from the Deccan and two which had re-formed after the 
Battle of Delhi.224 This battle spelled the end of French influence within India and the abilities of 
Scindia to withstand and repel British expansion. By Lake’s account, he led his cavalry on a forced 
march of twenty five miles, where he encountered the forces of Scindia, which he believed to be 
in retreat.225 Lake decided it wise to attack with his cavalry before his infantry could arrive. This 
action was slowed by a large reservoir of water which allowed the enemy time to form up to 
receive his cavalry. Having crossed the body of water, he claimed he did not see that the enemy 
had formed because of an excess of dust.226 In attempting to prevent what he believed was the 
enemy’s retreat, Lake attacked with unsupported cavalry, 227 an act which has earned him some 
derision. This is referenced by John Pemble, although he incorrectly attributes this cavalry action 
to the battle of Delhi.228 Lake withdrew his cavalry after capturing some of Scindia’s artillery, 
some of which he managed to take away in the face of heavy fire, while suffering significant 
casualties and losing several officers.229 At 11am Lake’s infantry arrived, but having made a long 
march Lake decided they needed to be rested before he set them against Scindia’s force. After 
receiving a request from the enemy to allow them to withdraw and surrender their guns, Lake 
granted them an hour to do so, during which time he formed up his infantry into columns to 
attack.230 However, after the hour was concluded and no more word was heard from Scindia’s 
force, Lake attacked. 231 
 
 
Lake described this battle of one of the hardest fought he had ever encountered, remarking that 
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the enemies gunners were excellent and that his foe fought like demons or even heroes. Lake’s 
attribution of heroic status to his Mahratta foes revealed a strong respect for the Mahratta 
soldiers in Hindustan. The overcoming of which was seen as a significant achievement. His forces 
took such heavy fire as they advanced, that Lake decided that it would be preferable to charge 
with whatever troops were immediately available and allow the remainder to follow suit.232 Lake 
also notes that the enemy’s force attempted to withdraw in good order only when they had lost 
their artillery, but that this withdrawal was thwarted by his cavalry, which broke the withdrawing 
columns.233 The battle was undoubtedly Lake’s greatest victory of the campaign, and one he 
professed no desire to see the like of again, as although a significant victory, it came at the cost 
of many of his own forces. However, as a result of this victory, Lake broke the power of Scindia’s 
French led forces in Hindustan some nine days after Arthur Wellesley’s victory at Assaye. 
 
Culmination of Lake’s campaign 
These significant victories led to two treaties being signed, the Treaty of Deogaum between the 
EIC and Bhonsla,234 and the treaty of Surje Anjengaum between the EIC and Scindia.235 The terms 
of these treaties significantly expanded the influence and authority of the EIC, and so contributed 
to the expansion of British India. These treaties were arranged by Arthur Wellesley, as Scindia 
and Bhonsla were within the Deccan opposing his force. It was the defeat of their forces in both 
the Deccan and Hindustan which led to their capitulation. These treaties set out harsh conditions 
for the two Mahratta chiefs, both beginning with an article relating to perpetual peace between 
the two sides and including declaring declaration that the Mahratta chiefs would never again 
employ Europeans whose country may be at war with Britain.236 The Treaty of Deogaum requiring 
Bhonsla to cede to the company the province of Cuttack and many other territories from which 
he received revenue, and his right to mediate disputes was also granted to the EIC.237 The Treaty 
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of Surje Anjengaum had similar articles, and included the ownership of several forts which were 
to be passed to the EIC and required Scindia to renounce all claims upon the person of Shah 
Hallam, and promise not to interfere in his concerns.238  
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Conclusion 
 
The ability of the EIC to overcome political, logistical and strategic issues within this period 
allowed for the expansion of British influence, and it is clear that this was a key period for the 
expansion of British India. Close examination of the conflict against Scindia and Bhonsla, in both 
the Deccan and Hindustan, reveal the importance of this period, during which several of the 
major powers of India were brought to heel by the EIC. Although this period of rapid expansion 
can be seen to begin with the arrival of Richard Wellesley and the annexation of Mysore, the 
Mahratta campaigns brought British primacy to an even greater level, with lasting gains for the 
EIC. The position of the EIC was legitimised by its changing status regarding the Emperor Shah 
Allam. Shah Allam, from this point onwards can be seen to rely on the EIC for his protection. As 
a result of this he was no longer seen to be the nominal overlord of the British in India, except on 
paper. This conflict strengthened the ties of the EIC to the Nizam of Hyderbad, British protection 
of his lands from the Mahrattas, and the territories awarded to him increased his reliance on 
British soldiery. Ties were also created with the Peshwa, Baji Rao, who now, like Shah Allam 
became in effect a subject ruler of the EIC. Also of key importance was the destruction of the 
major forces of military opposition in the forms of Dawlut Rao Scindia, and Bhonsla, the Rajah of 
Berar. The victories gained by British forces within this period of conflict strengthened the 
reputation of the British in India, as they can be seen to have won several major victories against 
superior numbers and so a myth of British invincibility began to take shape. This conflict 
weakened to the point of destruction the influence and prestige of the French within India, as in 
many cases, as well as losing battles, the French officers can be seen to have acted poorly, and 
often defected, especially evident in the case of Scindia’s General Perron.239 The period of conflict 
in 1803 between the Mahratta forces of Scindia and Bhonsla and the EIC were of singular 
importance regarding the expansion of British India. 
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